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Abstract
A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for green-
house gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to
the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive
effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side
payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via
their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabi-
lizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to
invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Con-
trasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.
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1 Introduction
One of the main global challenges of today is the problem of anthropogenic climate change. At
its core lies a public goods problem which, by conventional economic wisdom, could be solved
by global cooperation that benefits all participants. In practice, global agreements to curb the
emission of greenhouse gases have however been proven elusive (e.g., failure of the Copenhagen
climate summit, or reluctance of the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto-protocol). Focusing on the timing
of climate agreements under multiple externalities, this paper contributes to a growing body
of literature that addresses the difficulties in reaching such agreements.1 In particular, we
consider a dynamic cooperation game, in which countries can either sign a long-term climate
agreement before choosing their R&D investments, delay cooperation until after investing in
R&D, or decide against cooperation all together. Within this setup we identify the strategic
effects of the different options and show how asymmetries between countries and the inability
to use side-payments can lead to a delay or even a complete failure of cooperation.
At the heart of our analysis lies the notion that multiple externalities underlie the challenge
of climate change. Apart from the environmental externality of emissions, also R&D efforts
in the area of low-carbon technologies exhibit strong externalities globally. In the light of
such knowledge spillovers, the development of low-carbon technologies becomes, similar to the
abatement of emissions, a global public goods problem itself, which also calls for international
cooperation. Yet, in the past, international climate negotiations focused primarily on emis-
sions reductions. We follow this dichotomy and consider countries that can only cooperate in
abatement efforts, but not in R&D.
The double public goods problem of abatement externalities and R&D spillovers further
adds a dynamic aspect to the cooperation problem, because technological progress is a time-
consuming process whereas abatement targets are adjustable also in the near term. To take this
dynamic perspective into account explicitly, we model countries’ abatement and R&D choices in
two separate stages. In the absence of cooperation, each country chooses first its R&D efforts,
and subsequently its abatement effort.
The timing allows us to distinguish between two types of cooperative outcomes: late and
early cooperation. Under ‘late cooperation’, countries first determine their R&D efforts non-
cooperatively, and subsequently choose their abatement efforts cooperatively. Hence, under
late cooperation there is a delay in the climate negotiations, and countries’ future abatement
efforts are determined on a short-term basis after countries have already invested in low-carbon
1We discuss the relevant literature in the next subsection, where we also relate our results to the existing
findings.
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technologies. We, however, also consider the possibility that countries sign a long-term contract
that fixes future abatement targets early on. Under such ‘early cooperation’ countries sign
an agreement on long-term abatement targets before their R&D efforts are determined non-
cooperatively.
Contrasting early to late cooperation, we show that early cooperation is often (NOT AL-
WAYS?!!) welfare-superior to late cooperation (or no cooperation). The difficulty, however, is
to achieve such an early agreement when countries are asymmetric and act strategically. As-
suming that side-payments cannot be implemented, a country with a low valuation for climate
stabilization may prefer to delay cooperation if it expects a better outcome than under the
early agreement.2
For each of the two timing regimes, we identify the different strategic effects that arise
and show that the relative strength of these effects determine when and whether cooperation
obtains in equilibrium. In particular, we identify a redistributive effect that leads to underin-
vestments in low-carbon technologies under late cooperation. Intuitively, by reducing its own
R&D effort, a country can assure that it is assigned a lower abatement target in the subsequent
cooperative stage so that the overall gains from cooperation are shifted in its own favor, even
though side-payments are not available. The redistributive effect can, thus, cause a strategic
delay of cooperation when countries are asymmetric. We show that even small asymmetries
between countries can be sufficient to induce such an inefficient delay of cooperation. Further-
more, we identify a strategic complementarity effect under early cooperation that is related to
the double public goods problem. Intuitively, by assigning a higher abatement obligation to
a country at the early cooperative stage, the country is induced to invest more in the subse-
quent non-cooperative R&D stage when abatement and R&D are strategic complements. This
creates additional knowledge spillovers and, hence, can partially correct for the lack of cooper-
ation in R&D. The complementarity effect improves the overall welfare under early (long-term)
cooperation (as compared to late cooperation), and can stabilize early cooperation even in the
presence of large asymmetries between countries.
A necessary requirement for early cooperation to succeed under large asymmetries is the
presence of sufficiently strong knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, if the abatement spillovers
between countries are asymmetric, then the R&D spillovers must be asymmetric as well to
render early cooperation stable, and they must mainly affect the country that benefits less from
2We follow the usual modeling approach that whenever countries cooperate, they seek to maximize their
joint welfare. Under early cooperation, this implies that they also take into account how their cooperative
abatement choices will affect their future, non-cooperative R&D efforts.
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abatement spillovers. To illustrate the potential practical relevance of this, consider a country
that attaches a high value to the damages of climate change so that it is strongly affected by
the other country’s abatement efforts. Suppose further that the other country is a technological
follower vis-à-vis the first country, and places a lower weight on the issue of climate change.
Under such circumstances a long-term agreement on future abatement efforts may be negotiated
successfully, despite the asymmetries between countries. Intuitively, the technological leader
is willing to sign an early agreement because it induces the other country to adopt a higher
abatement target. Conversely, the technological follower signs the agreement because this
induces the leader to subsequently invest more in R&D. If the resulting technology spillovers
are sufficiently strong, they compensate the follower for the higher abatement obligation under
an early agreement.
1.1 Related literature
Although our dynamic model of climate cooperation and the resulting dynamic interplay of
the different strategic effects is new, the different strategic effects themselves have already been
recognized in the literature. In this subsection we relate our results to both this literature and
the broader economic literature on climate cooperation.
The literature that emphasizes the freerider effect as a main obstacle to effective climate
cooperation (e.g., Barrett, 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993, and also Finus 2008) highlights
that, since climate stabilization is a public good, each country prefers other countries to abate
more, but may not benefit from contributing substantially to this public good itself. As a
result of this freerider problem, only a small number of countries may sign a climate treaty,
and especially so when the potential gains from cooperation are large. Hence, effective climate
treaties that must be self-enforcing with respect to participation, are often not sustainable.
Because we analyze cooperation between only two players, we abstract from these concerns.
This enables us to show clearly how, in addition to freeriding problems, also asymmetries
between countries, in conjunction with multiple externalities can act as an impediment to
cooperation, leading to a possible delay or to a failure of cooperation.
Barrett (1997) and Botteon and Carraro (1997) have shown that the freerider effect also
destabilizes cooperation when countries exhibit asymmetries.3 Barrett (2001), Carraro, Eyck-
mans, and Finus (2006), and Harstad (2007), however, point out that with asymmetric countries
side-payments can play an important role for stabilizing cooperation. Based on information
3See also Kolstad (2010), Hannesson (2010), and McGinty (2007).
4
collected in Barrett (2003), Battaglini and Harstad (2012), however, argue that many inter-
national environmental agreements either do not include transfers, or include transfers that
are “insignificant (at least compared to the size of the problems they are supposed to solve)”
(ADD THE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THIS QUOTE HERE!!). Folmer, Mouche, Ragland
(1993) offer a number of explanations why significant side-payments are rarely observed in in-
ternational environmental agreements. In line with these results that explicit side-payments
are difficult to implement and enforce in practise, we rule them out in our analysis.
Timing aspects of environmental regulation are considered also by Requate (2005), who
analyzes the adoption of a new technology in a model with endogenous R&D but abstracts
from problems related with transboundary pollution. Heal and Tarui (2010) endogenize R&D
and abatement efforts in a model with N countries (or ‘agents’), where environmental dam-
ages depend on the aggregate of emissions. Golombek and Hoel (2004) analyze a two-country
model with endogenous R&D and abatement choices, and R&D spillovers, but do not consider
environmental cooperation.
(THE FORMER SUBSEQUENT TEXT CONCERNING R&H 2008 I FOUND SOME-
WHAT CLUMSY BECAUSE IT BASICALLY SUGGESTED THAT ALL OUR IMPORTANT
RESULTS ARE ALREADY IN G&H AND THE READER WOULD THEN WONDER WHY
TO READ OUR PAPER!!!) Our paper is more closely related to Golombek and Hoel (2008)
who, similar to us, analyze a two-country model with cooperation in abatement but not in
R&D. In contrast to our paper, the authors consider only the case where abatement obligations
are determined in a stage prior to the R&D stage. The authors identify the ’complementar-
ity effect’ that countries may agree on higher abatement targets in order to trigger additional
knowledge spillovers, but since they do not consider possible delays in cooperation, they do not
obtain result XYZ (PLEASE FILL IN HERE THE MAIN DIFFERENCES TO US).4
In a model with an exogenous delay in climate cooperation and bargaining, Beccherle and
Tirole (2011) identify an “intertemporal substitution effect” and a “brinkmanship effect” that
induce countries to strategically lower their R&D investments (or other efforts) at the early
stage, in order to affect their own (respectively, their competitor’s) outside option in the bar-
gaining stage (see also Buchholz and Konrad, 1994, for a related contribution). These authors
show that, under such circumstances, total welfare may be even lower than in the absence of
any cooperation. In contrast, we abstract from bargaining in our model and instead follow the
4Environmental policy design in the presence of innovation externalities is also analyzed by Fischer, Parry,
Pizer (2003), and Gerlagh, Kverndokk, Rosendahl (2009). Evidence on the importance of technology spillovers
is provided, e.g., by Eaton and Kortum (1999). See also Jaffe, Newell, Stavins (2005).
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modeling approach that whenever countries cooperate, they succeed in maximizing their joint
welfare (REFERENCES HERE OF PAPERS THAT DO THIS). Moreover, we do not assume
that there is an exogenous delay in cooperation. If there is a delay, it arises endogenously
because it is in the interest of one of the countries.
Harstad (2012) analyzes a model where countries repeatedly invest (e.g., in capacities for
renewable engergies), and cooperate in their abatement choices. If a country invests more (e.g.,
in renewable energies or R&D) then it is expected to emit less in the future. As a response,
the other countries raise their emissions and lower their investments because the overall dam-
ages are quadratic in the pollution stock. The resulting hold-up problem is particularly severe
under short-term cooperation, so that the overall outcome can be worse than under no coop-
eration. Also in our model, a hold-up problem arises under short-term (late) cooperation. If
a country invests more in R&D at the early stage, then it will be asked to abate more in the
future. Under delayed cooperation, countries thus strategically lower their R&D efforts. (THIS
DESCRIPTION OF HARSTAD 2012 IS MUCH TOO LONG AND DOES NOT CLEARLY
POINT OUT THE DIFFERENCE TO OUR WORK. CAN YOU SHORTEN IT AND MAKE
EXPLICIT THE DIFFERENCE TO US?) Battaglini and Harstad (2013) endogenize partici-
pation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic setting. The authors show that
countries’ inability to include investments in a climate contract may actually raise the efficiency
of the agreements, because this mitigates the freerider incentive. Since this stabilizing effect
depends on an infinite time horizon, it does not obtain in our model, where the dynamic game is
finite. In contrast, we allow a more general specification of the spillovers between countries, and
focuses explicitly on the role of asymmetries between countries for the timing of cooperation.
Finally, Barrett (2006) analyzes the development of ‘breakthrough technologies’, assuming that
countries can sign multiple treaties, one for the development of new technologies, and another
one for their deployment. In contrast and as motivated above, we study delays in cooperation
when countries cannot cooperate in their production technologies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
In Section 3, we derive optimality conditions to characterize the outcome in the four different
cooperation regimes that we consider: full cooperation, no cooperation, early, and late cooper-
ation. In Section 4, we endogenize the timing of cooperation and identify the effects of different
kinds of asymmetries. In Section 5, we introduce a specification of our general model that is
suitable especially for an application to climate agreements. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix collects all formal proofs.
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2 Basic Model
Consider two countries i ∈ {1, 2} that choose emissions targets. The targets are measured in
terms of abatement of emissions relative to some “business-as-usual” scenario. The abatement
targets are denoted by ai ≥ 0. In addition, each country has the possibility to invest in R&D
in order to reduce the costs of abatement.5 Country i’s R&D effort is denoted by ri ≥ 0. Due
to environmental externalities, country i’s welfare may depend on overall abatement levels.
Furthermore, country i’s costs of abatement can, due to knowledge spillovers, depend also on
the other country’s R&D effort. More specifically, country i’s welfare, which reflects the net
benefit of abatement, is denoted by Πi and given by
Πi(a1, a2, r1, r2) ≡ Bi(a1, a2)− Ci(ai, r1, r2), (1)
where Bi measures environmental benefits and Ci the abatement costs of country i, including
its R&D investment costs. In the absence of R&D spillovers, Ci depends on ri but not on r−i.
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In line with Beccherle and Tirole (2011), we concentrate on linear benefit functions:
Bi(ai, a−i) = biai + β−ia−i,
where bi > 0 and β−i ∈ [0, bi]. We say that country −i has a positive abatement externality on
country i if β
−i > 0. In the extreme β−i = bi, so that country −i’s abatement has the same
marginal effect on country i’s total benefit as country i’s own abatement ai. The linear spec-
ification allows us to show that direct interactions between abatement and R&D externalities
can already lead to strategic delays in cooperation.7
We consider general cost functions Ci that are convex in (ai, r1, r2), so that the country’s
welfare function Πi is concave in (a1, a2, r1, r2). More specifically, we assume that for any a1,































5Hence, we model each country as picking R&D effort directly. Alternatively, we could assume that R&D
is carried out by firms, but countries can regulate the firms’ R&D efforts indirectly with a subsidy (See for
instance Golombek and Hoel 2008). These two modeling approaches are formally equivalent when, as is the
case in our framework, there is full information and the subsidy targets directly the firms’ R&D efforts but not
the firms’ other choices (such as output or prices).
6For the indices, by convention, let −i ≡ 2 if i = 1, and −i ≡ 1 if i = 2.
7Concave benefit functions exhibit ∂2B(a1, a2)/(∂a1∂a2) < 0, which gives rise to what is known as the
“raising rivals’ costs effect” in industrial organization. This effect renders the analysis less tractable, while it
actually “magnifies the strategic incentive” (Beccherle and Tirole, 2011) of delay.
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We say that country i exerts a positive R&D externality on country −i if ∂C
−i/∂ri < 0.
Furthermore, we assume that the cost function Ci is U-shaped in ri (for any given values of
ai and r−i), so that there exists a unique cost-minimizing level of ri.
8 The intuition behind
the other conditions is also straightforward. The condition ∂2C
−i/∂r−i∂ri ≥ 0 for instance
captures the standard assumption that R&D efforts are strategic substitutes. The condition
∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri < 0 implies that R&D reduces the marginal cost of abatement. Furthermore, we
focus on the natural case where the R&D externalities do not exceed their corresponding direct
effects. That is, we assume: ∂2Ci/∂r
2
i > ∂
2Ci/∂ri∂r−i, and |∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri| ≥ |∂2Ci/∂ai∂r−i|.9
Focusing on the ongoing discussion of climate agreements, we consider countries that have
the possibility to cooperate in abatement efforts, but not in R&D (see Beccherle and Tirole,
2011; Golombek and Hoel, 2008; Harstad, 2012). We also follow the literature (e.g. Barrett,
2001; Kolstad, 2010) by assuming that if countries agree to cooperate, then the abatement
targets are always chosen to maximize the total welfare of both countries: Π ≡ Π1 + Π2. We
thereby also abstract from any enforceability issues concerning these agreements. To capture the
difficulty of implementing conditional side-payments in practice, we rule out such side-payments
altogether. We say that a country has an incentive to cooperate, if its payoff from cooperation
exceeds its payoff without cooperation. If both counties have an incentive to cooperate, then
cooperation succeeds. In other words, cooperation fails as soon as one country does not have
an incentive to cooperate. This can occur when countries are asymmetric, because the benefits
of cooperation are, then, also shared asymmetrically. In the case of global climate agreements
these asymmetries are substantial. Hence, we are especially interested in identifying the role of
asymmetries as an impediment to achieving cooperation.
To understand how the presence of multiple externalities and the timing of cooperation
affect outcomes, our approach is to first analyze the following sub-cases independently:








) cooperatively to maximize the joint
surplus Π.




) non-cooperatively, and subse-















8Recall that in our formulation, investment costs in R&D are included in Ci as well as the abatement costs.
9The latter condition holds with equality if knowledge is treated as a pure public good.
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The first two cases represent benchmarks which we use in order to evaluate the outcomes under
early and late cooperation. Overall, the analysis of these cases enables us to identify and
to classify the interactions of the different spillover effects under different, exogenously-given
timing regimes.
In a second step, we then study the cooperation and timing decision by considering an
overall game where the choice whether to cooperate early, late, or not arises endogenously and
is part of the equilibrium outcome. The following figure illustrates the time structure of this
overall game:10
Figure 1
In the first stage, countries simultaneously decide whether they are willing to sign a long-
term agreement or not. Hence, each country i has a binary decision ei, where ei = 1 indicates
country i’s willingness to cooperate early, and ei = 0 means that country i rejects early co-
operation. Early cooperation succeeds if and only if e1 = e2 = 1. In this case, the subgame
“E” is entered, which coincides with the early cooperation case introduced above. Hence, in
this subgame, countries first choose their abatement targets cooperatively. Subsequently, they
decide about their R&D investments non-cooperatively.
As soon as some country i blocks long-term cooperation by choosing ei = 0, early cooper-
ation fails and the countries enter the subgame “LN”. In this subgame, countries first choose
their R&D efforts (r1, r2) simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Subsequently, given r1 and
r2, countries simultaneously decide about the formation of a late (short-term) climate agree-
ment. Hence, at this later cooperation stage each country has again a binary decision li, where
li = 1 indicates country i’s willingness to cooperate. Late cooperation succeeds if and only if
l1 = l2 = 1. In this case, countries choose their abatement targets ai cooperatively. Otherwise,
a1 and a2 are determined non-cooperatively. Underlying this sequence of events is the notion
that R&D is a time-consuming process, so current R&D efforts reduce future abatement costs.11
10The dotted line at the bottom left of the figure indicates that the implementation of the chosen abatement
levels under early cooperation is not a decision.
11Near-term abatement (before R&D levels are chosen) is not explicitly modeled. Underlying this approach
is the implicit assumption that near-term abatement efforts do not interact strongly with the variables of the
model. See Beccherle and Tirole (2011).
9
Note, that the subgame LN comprises both the late cooperation and the no cooperation
case introduced earlier. This implies that at the R&D stage, countries anticipate whether late
cooperation will succeed or fail, and adjust their R&D efforts accordingly as different strategic
effects arise in these cases. We explicitly analyze these strategic effects in Section 3, where the
success and the timing (the ‘mode’) of cooperation is treated as exogenous. When the mode
of cooperation is endogenous, then in case of a failure of early cooperation, countries take into
account how their R&D efforts affect also the success of late cooperation.12 In Section 4, we
endogenize the mode of cooperation, taking these strategic considerations into account.
3 Strategic Effects
In this section, we identify the different strategic effects that arise under early, late, and no
cooperation by contrasting the equilibrium conditions for each of the four cases: 1. full co-
operation, 2. no cooperation, 3. early cooperation, and 4. late cooperation. We also use these
equilibrium conditions to characterize inefficiencies that arise in the absence of full cooperation,
and to obtain comparative welfare results.
3.1 Full cooperation
Under full cooperation, countries maximize the joint surplus Π. Hence, they solve the following
maximization problem: maxa1,a2,r1,r2 Π(a1, a2, r1, r2). Because the target function is concave,








) satisfies the first-order conditions13
∂Ci
∂ai








These optimality conditions are intuitive. The first condition states that country i’s marginal
abatement cost equals its aggregated marginal benefit of abatement. The second condition says
that the aggregated abatement costs are minimized over ri. Both abatement and R&D spillovers
are fully internalized. Due to the convexity of Ci, expression (2) indicates that the presence
of a larger abatement externality (βi > 0) implies more abatement. Similarly, expression (3)
shows that larger knowledge spillovers from R&D (∂C
−i/∂ri < 0) imply higher levels of R&D.
12E.g., country 1 may raise its R&D effort in the subgame LN in order to induce country 2 to agree to the
formation of a late coalition.
13To increase readability, we suppress the functional arguments and the condition i ∈ {1, 2} whenever this
does not lead to confusion.
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3.2 No cooperation
Under no cooperation, countries play a non–cooperative, sequential game. In the first stage,
they simultaneously choose their R&D efforts. In the second stage, they choose their abatement
levels. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game by backwards induction.
In the second stage, R&D levels (r̄1, r̄2) are given and country i’s reaction function follows











In the first stage, countries choose their R&D levels (r1, r2) while anticipating the outcome







(r1, r2), r1, r2).
















































Condition (4) differs from (2) as countries neglect abatement spillovers, and the left-hand side
of (5) differs from (3) as countries neglect R&D spillovers. This leads to reduced abatement
and R&D efforts under no cooperation, compared to the fully cooperative outcome.
On the right-hand side of (5), we identify as a strategic double spillover effect that raises
R&D incentives. To understand the intuition behind this effect, observe that by raising its R&D
effort ri in stage 1, the R&D externality will induce the other country to raise its abatement
level a
−i in stage 2. Because of the spillover in abatement, this benefits the original country
and induces it to raise its R&D levels. We emphasize that this positive effect on R&D levels
occurs only if there are spillovers in both R&D and abatement. The following lemma confirms
formally that this double spillover effect tends to raise R&D efforts, compared to the case where
the effect is neglected in stage 1.14 Hence, it mitigates the aforementioned negative effect on
R&D efforts.
14The outcome would then be defined by the following system: ∂Ci/∂ai = bi and ∂Ci/∂ri = 0.
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Lemma 1 In the presence of abatement and R&D externalities, the strategic double spillover
effect under no cooperation induces higher R&D efforts if countries are symmetric.
The symmetry assumption is needed because when countries are asymmetric, a strong
increase in the R&D effort of one country can lead to a crowding-out of R&D by the other
country, so that overall, the R&D effort of the latter country may be lower than in the absence
of the strategic effect.
To summarize, there are three reasons why the outcome under no cooperation differs from
the outcome under full cooperation: 1. the neglect of abatement externalities, 2. the neglect of
R&D externalities, 3. a double spillover effect that raises R&D incentives. The first two effects
are straightforward and, respectively, lower the incentives for abatement and R&D. The third
effect is more subtle and mitigates the second effect.15
3.3 Early cooperation









) non-cooperatively. In the spirit of




) that maximize the joint surplus
Π under full anticipation of how the countries react to these abatement levels in stage 2 when
choosing their R&D levels non-cooperatively. More specifically, the reaction to abatement levels





) that solves (for i = 1, 2)
∂Πi(ā1, ā2, r1, r2)
∂ri
= 0. (6)



























































15A similar effect is obtained by Golombek and Hoel (2004).
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Condition (8) differs from (3) as countries neglect knowledge spillovers in their choice of R&D
levels. Hence, as in the case with no cooperation, each country minimizes its own abatement
costs, given its abatement target assigned in stage 1.
We next interpret the equilibrium condition (7). In line with condition (2), its right-hand
side displays the aggregated marginal benefit of abatement, because in both cases countries
cooperate in stage 1. The left-hand side however shows, next to the marginal abatement cost
of country i, two strategic effects which are both due to the R&D externality.
Because of positive R&D spillovers (∂C
−i/∂ri < 0), the first of these effects tends to raise
the abatement target assigned to country i in the cooperative stage. Intuitively, by assigning a
higher abatement target to country i, additional R&D investments by this country are triggered
in the non-cooperative stage. This leads to spillovers that reduce country −i’s abatement costs.
Hence, this strategic effect alleviates the inefficiency resulting from knowledge spillovers that
are not internalized in stage 2.
The second strategic effect counterbalances the first strategic effect because, due to the R&D
spillovers (∂Ci/∂r−i < 0), it reduces abatement levels in the cooperative stage. Intuitively, by
assigning a higher abatement target to country i, higher R&D investments by this country
are triggered. Because R&D efforts are strategic substitutes, they partially crowd-out R&D
investments by country −i. This reduces the positive spillovers from country −i’s R&D upon
country i’s abatement costs. To reduce this negative side effect, ai is reduced in the cooperative
stage.
The next lemma shows that the positive strategic effect outweighs the negative strategic
effect so that, taken together, they raise total welfare unambiguously, compared to the case
where the effects are neglected in stage 1.16 Moreover, under symmetry, early cooperation
in abatement levels leads to higher R&D efforts for each country. Hence, even though there
is no direct cooperation in R&D, early cooperation in abatement partially offsets the lack of
cooperation in R&D. It, in particular, implies that long-term cooperation in abatement does
not lead to a crowding-out in R&D efforts. Under early cooperation, abatement and R&D act
as complements rather than substitutes. Therefore, we refer to the overall strategic effect under
early cooperation as complementarity effect.
Lemma 2 In the presence of knowledge spillovers, the overall strategic effect under early co-
operation raises aggregate welfare. Furthermore, if countries are symmetric, it induces higher
R&D efforts at the non-cooperative stage, by assigning to each country a higher abatement target
at the cooperative stage.
16The outcome would then be defined by the following system: ∂Ci/∂ai = bi + βi and ∂Ci/∂ri = 0.
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To summarize, we identify three qualitatively different effects by which the outcome under
early cooperation differs from the outcome under full cooperation: 1. the neglect of R&D exter-
nalities; 2. a complementarity effect of abatement that raises R&D incentives; 3. a crowding-out
effect that lowers R&D incentives, but which does not offset the aforementioned complemen-
tarity effect of abatement.
3.4 Late cooperation
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in stage 2. Country i’s maximization problem is
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∂Ci
∂ai












Condition (10) coincides with (2) if the fixed R&D levels r̄1 and r̄2 are the same. However,
condition (11), which determines the R&D levels, differs from the optimality condition in the
fully cooperative case (3). As under early cooperation, countries neglect knowledge spillovers in
their choice of R&D levels. As compared to (3), the optimality condition (11), therefore, lacks
the derivative ∂C
−i/∂ri on its left-hand side. On the right-hand side, we observe two strategic




−i/∂ri, tends to increase R&D incentives. Intuitively, if country i raises its
R&D effort in stage 1, this induces country −i to abate more in the cooperative stage due to
14
knowledge spillovers that reduce its marginal abatement costs. In the presence of abatement
externalities, this positively affects country i’s own welfare and, hence, increases its R&D
incentives. In contrast, the second effect, −βi∂ali/∂ri, lowers R&D incentives. Intuitively,
each country has an incentive to enter the cooperative stage with high marginal abatement
costs, because this implies that it will be assigned a lower abatement effort. By lowering its
own R&D effort, a country shifts the burden of abatement towards the other country, in an
attempt to redistribute the gains from cooperation in its own favor. This redistributive effect
reduces countries’ R&D incentives. The next lemma shows that, under symmetric abatement
externalities, the two effects work in opposite directions, but the overall effect lowers R&D
incentives, compared to the case where countries neglect strategic effects in stage 1.17
Lemma 3 In stage 1 of the late cooperation game, there are two strategic effects. If abatement
externalities are symmetric (β1 = β2 > 0), they work in opposite directions. The overall effect,
however, leads to lower investments in R&D and, thus, reduces total welfare.
To summarize, we identify three qualitatively different effects by which the outcome under
late cooperation differs from the outcome under full cooperation: 1. the neglect of R&D ex-
ternalities; 2. a redistributive effect that lowers R&D incentives; 3. a double externality effect
that raises R&D incentives but does not offset the second effect when abatement externalities
are not too asymmetric.18
3.5 Comparisons
In the following, we use our previous findings to obtain comparative welfare results, that are
valid when the mode of cooperation (early, late, no) is treated as exogenous.
Proposition 1 Without R&D externalities, early cooperation leads to the fully cooperative out-
come and, therefore, to a higher aggregate welfare than late cooperation.
To understand this result note that, in the absence of R&D externalities, there are no
potential gains from cooperation in terms of R&D. Hence, under full cooperation, given the
assigned abatement target, each country minimizes its own abatement costs. But this is also
achieved under early cooperation.
17The outcome would then be defined by the following system: ∂Ci/∂ai = bi + βi and ∂Ci/∂ri = 0.
18By continuity, the assumption of symmetric abatement spillovers (β1 = β2) in Lemma 3 can be replaced by
the requirement that abatement externalities are not too asymmetric.
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Proposition 2 Without abatement externalities, the outcome under late cooperation coincides
with the outcome under no cooperation so that early cooperation is welfare superior to late
cooperation.
In the absence of abatement externalities, there are for any fixed R&D levels no potential
gains from cooperation. Hence, late cooperation has no effect upon the final outcome when
compared to no cooperation. Early cooperation, however, can achieve welfare gains because, by
assigning higher abatement targets to each country in stage 1, countries can trigger additional
R&D spillovers in stage 2 and, thus, partially correct for the market failure induced by the
R&D externality.
Proposition 3 If abatement externalities are symmetric, early cooperation is welfare superior
to late cooperation under R&D externalities.
Proposition 3 extends the results from Propositions 1 and 2 to situations where there exist
both abatement and R&D externalities. At first sight, one may think that early cooperation
should always dominate late cooperation in terms of aggregate welfare. Yet, the proposition
has the qualifier that abatement externalities are symmetric. This begs the question whether
we can actually dispense with this qualifier. Clearly, by continuity, the proposition will hold
also for small asymmetries, but we next show that under large asymmetries early cooperation
can sometimes yield a lower aggregate welfare than late cooperation.
To this end, consider an example with extreme asymmetries in abatement and R&D exter-
nalities. Suppose, country 1 benefits only from abatement by country 2, whereas country 2 does
not benefit from any abatement at all: B1(a1, a2) = a2 and B2(a1, a2) = 0 (b1 = b2 = β1 = 0,
β2 = 1). Moreover, suppose country 1 does not benefit from R&D spillovers, while country
2 benefits only from the R&D spillovers from country 1 and not from its own R&D effort:





and C2(a2, r1, r2) = a
3
2
/(1 + 2r1) + r
2
2
. Therefore, country 1’s optimal
abatement is always: a1 = 0. Similarly, R&D of country 2 induces only costs. Hence: r2 = 0.
Using a1 = r2 = 0, the payoff functions of the two countries simplify to: Π1 = a2 − r21 and
Π2 = −a32/(1 + 2r1).19 We next show how the abatement level a2 and R&D level r1 depend on
the timing of cooperation.
Under early cooperation, the abatement levels are fixed at the R&D stage, and because
R&D is only costly to country 1, it optimally chooses r1 = 0. Given that country 1 exerts no
19Alternatively, one can reformulate this example by assuming that country 1 benefits also from its own
abatement but faces prohibitively high marginal abatement costs (so a1 = 0 is always obtained), while country
2 faces prohibitively high marginal R&D costs (so r2 = 0 always holds). Under these assumptions, the same
results are obtained.
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R&D effort, the optimal level of abatement under early cooperation maximizes a2 − a32, which
yields a2 =
√
3/3. This outcome yields aggregate welfare of approximately 0.38.
Under late cooperation, the abatement levels are chosen after the R&D efforts and, in
contrast to early cooperation, country 1 now has an incentive to invest in R&D in order to
reduce country 2’s costs of abatement and, thereby, trigger a higher abatement level at the
cooperative stage. Indeed, given some R&D effort r1, late cooperation leads to a2 =
√
3 + 6r1/3.
Anticipating how country 2 raises its abatement in response to R&D from country 1, it is
optimal for country 1 to choose a positive R&D level of r1 ≈ 0.42, resulting in a total welfare
of approximately 0.43 > 0.38.
The counter-intuitive result that late cooperation outperforms early cooperation is best un-
derstood by recalling the different strategic effects. We demonstrated this result in a setup
where only the double externality effect under late cooperation is present, whereas the com-
plementarity effect under early cooperation is absent.20 As a result, country 1’s R&D effort is
zero under early cooperation, whereas the double externality effect assures that incentives for
R&D exist under late cooperation. This leads to a higher aggregate welfare under late than
under early cooperation.
Finally, we also point out that there is no unambiguous ranking in total welfare of late
cooperation versus no cooperation. Indeed, late cooperation can lead to a lower aggregated
welfare than no cooperation. This is the case if the strategic redistributive effect is sufficiently
strong so that an incentive exists to enter the cooperative stage with high marginal abatement
costs. These higher abatement costs then lead to more distortions than without any coopera-
tion, even though the non-cooperative case implies that neither environmental externalities nor
knowledge spillover effects are internalized. Beccherle and Tirole (2011) obtain a similar result
in a setup with side-payments.
4 Endogenous Timing of Cooperation
In this section, we endogenize the success and timing of cooperation by performing an integrated
analysis of the overall cooperation game as illustrated in Figure 1. We are especially interested
in understanding the conditions under which early cooperation does not arise as an endogenous
20Formally, this results from ∂C1/∂r2 = ∂
2C1/(∂r1∂a1) = ∂
2C1/(∂r1∂r2) = 0. See (7), and the expressions
for ∂rei /∂ai and ∂r
e
−i/∂ai given in the proof of Lemma 2. Note also that Lemma 3 does not apply here, as the
abatement externalities are asymmetric in this example. This explains why the overall strategic effect under
late cooperation can induce higher investments in R&D.
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mode of cooperation. We build on our results of the previous section.
It follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2 that when there is only one type of
externality (either abatement or R&D), and countries are symmetric, then early cooperation
is always obtained in equilibrium. Hence, early cooperation may fail due to the presence of
multiple externalites and due to asymmetries between countries.
In order to gain a better understanding of why and how the presence of multiple externalites
and asymmetries can lead to a failure of early cooperation, we focus in particular on the effects of
asymmetries in spillovers. Asymmetric spillovers may arise for different reasons. For instance,
countries may be asymmetric with respect to their technological state in that one country is a
technological leader, while the other is a follower. In this case, knowledge spillovers will mostly
be unidirectional, from the leader to the follower. Similarly, asymmetries in abatement spillovers
may exist when some countries are, due to their specific location, particularly vulnerable to
climate change, while others are less affected, or when one country attaches a higher value to
this problem.21 In Subsection 4.1, we consider unilateral externalities as an extreme case of
asymmetric spillovers. In Subsection 4.2, we then study more thoroughly the interplay between
the multiple externality problem and asymmetries, and analyze when this leads to a delay or a
failure of cooperation.
4.1 Unilateral externalities
An extreme case of asymmetric spillover effects arises in the presence of unilateral externalities.
This means that a given type of spillover affects only one country. In this subsection, we address
the stability and the timing of cooperation under such unilateral externalities.
Proposition 4 Cooperation fails entirely when there is only a unilateral abatement but no
R&D externality, or when there is a unilateral R&D but no abatement externality.
Intuitively, when there is only a unilateral externality in either abatement or R&D, then
the welfare of the country that generates the externality does neither depend on the abatement
nor on the R&D choice of the other country. Therefore, this country can attain its maximum
welfare without any cooperation (neither early nor late).
Proposition 5 When there is both a unilateral abatement and a unilateral R&D externality,
cooperation fails if both externalities affect the same country. If each of the externalities affects
a different country, then late cooperation fails, while early cooperation can succeed.
21A more classical example of such asymmetries would be two countries that share a river, with one country
being located upstream and the other one downstream.
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Early cooperation can succeed when there are two unilateral externalities that go in op-
posite directions and both are of comparable strength (otherwise externalities are mostly uni-
directional, so that by continuity, Proposition 4 applies). To understand the intuition behind
this result, observe that in the absence of an R&D externality, the country that generates the
abatement externality (say, country 1) always rejects to cooperate, because it would be as-
signed a higher abatement level under cooperation, which reduces its welfare. Conversely, in
the absence of an abatement externality, country 2 rejects to cooperate, because it is assigned
a higher abatement level to induce this country to invest more in R&D. By continuity, one can
find intermediate cases where both effects keep each other in balance so that both countries
benefit from early cooperation. Underlying this result is the strategic complementarity effect,
that can stabilize early cooperation even in the presence of strong asymmetries.
To see more clearly the different strategic effects that are underlying this result, rewrite
the optimality conditions for early cooperation ((7) and (8)) for this case, using β1 > β2 = 0,

















where the strategic effect −∂C1/∂r2 · ∂re2/∂a2 is positive.
Early cooperation succeeds if both countries achieve a welfare at least as large as under no














First consider the case where β1 = 0. The equilibrium conditions (12) and (13), then, simplify
further, and differ only in the strategic effect −∂C1/∂r2 · ∂re2/∂a2 that is present under early
cooperation, but absent under no cooperation. This effect leads to a higher abatement a2 in
stage 1 in order to trigger a higher R&D effort r2 in stage 2 and, thus, induces additional R&D
spillovers that benefit country 1. The effect, therefore, raises Π1 and lowers Π2 under early
cooperation, compared to the no cooperation case. Hence, for β1 = 0, we obtain the following









Let us now identify additional effects that occur when β1 is raised (in a comparative statics
sense). Conditions (12) reveal the following effects under early cooperation. 1. a1 is raised in
stage 1 to create additional abatement spillovers that benefit country 2 (direct effect). This
lowers Π1 and raises Π2, compared to the situation where the effect is neglected. 2. As a result
22From the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain with ∂C2/∂r1 = 0: ∂r
e
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of the first effect, r1 is raised in stage 2, which cushions the negative welfare effect upon Π1 (but
does not neutralize it), while Π2 is not affected. 3. The abatement a2 is raised in stage 1 (as a
result of the higher abatement target a1 assigned to country 1), in order to induce country 2 to
invest more in R&D in stage 2, which cushions the negative impact on welfare of the first effect,
but also does not neutralize it. The third effect reduces Π2, but does not offset the positive
impact on Π2 of effect 1.
23 In combination, the three effects raise Π2 and reduce Π1.
In contrast, under no cooperation, conditions (13) reveal the following effects that result
from an increase in β1. 1. Country 2 raises its R&D effort r2 in order to induce additional
knowledge spillovers for country 1, that increases its abatement effort in response (from which
country 2 benefits). 2. As a result of the higher R&D effort r2, country 2 also chooses a higher
abatement target a2 in stage 2 itself. This reduces the welfare cost incurred by this country due
to the higher R&D effort, but leaves country 1’s welfare unaffected (due to β2 = 0). Overall,
these effects raise welfare of both countries.24
In sum, raising β1, we find that Π1 and Π2 increase under no cooperation, while Π1 decreases












or not early cooperation can succeed for some values of β1 (for a given specification of the cost




is reversed first (for lower values





is reversed for higher values of β1. The example with two unilateral
externalities introduced at the end of the following subsection illustrates that such an outcome
can easily be obtained.
4.2 Multiple Externalities and Asymmetric Spillovers
In the remainder of this section, we analyze more generally how asymmetric spillovers affect
the endogenous mode of cooperation in the presence of multiple externalities. To this end,
we parameterize the strength of the different types of spillovers and show how the endogenous
success and the timing of cooperation in the overall game depend on the relative strength of
23To see this, note that countries could neglect the first effect, in which case also the other two effects vanish.
24Note that country 2 could neglect the effect in stage 1, so taking it into account, this country’s welfare is
higher. Country 1 benefits from the additional knowledge spillovers, because its own choices of a1 and r1 do
not have any impact on country 2’s decisions (a1 enters linearly in Π2, and r1 does not affect Π2).
25To see this, note that for high values of β1, under early cooperation the direct effect of this externality upon
a1 becomes very large (which raises Π
e
2
), and dominates the strategic effects under early and no cooperation
that occur due to the presence of knowledge spillovers. The situation, thus, resembles the case with only a
unilateral externality in abatement (Proposition 4).
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externalities between the two countries.
In particular, let the cost function exhibit the following form:




i − (1 + ai)ri − ρ−ir−i.
Moreover, let b1 = b2 = 1 so that the resulting payoff function of country i is
Πi(a1, a2, r1, r2) = ai − a2i + ri − r2i + airi + β−ia−i + ρ−ir−i. (14)
The parameter ρ
−i ∈ [0, 1] measures the R&D externality of country −i on country i. Note that
the payoff function is symmetric with respect to ai and ri. Hence, the interpretation of these
variables as abatement and R&D is, at this general level, arbitrary. In principle, they could
reflect any type of activities that cause externalities. What distinguishes these two variables
is only the assumption that countries can cooperate in their choice of (a1, a2), but not in their
choice of (r1, r2).
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As an aggregate measure of the externalities caused by country i, we define27
εi ≡ (βi + ρi)2 + 2βiρi.
If country i does not exert an abatement externality (βi = 0), it follows that εi = ρ
2
i . Conversely,
when ρi = 0 then εi = β
2
i .
Lemma 4 Suppose the countries’ payoff functions are given by (14). Then aggregate payoffs
are ranked as Πe ≥ Πl ≥ Πn. Contrary to this ranking, country i prefers late over early
cooperation (Πli > Π
e
i ) iff εi > 2ε−i, while it prefers the non-cooperative outcome over late
cooperation (Πni > Π
l




The parametrized model yields the unambiguous ranking Πf ≥ Πe ≥ Πl ≥ Πn. This in-
tuitive ranking obtains, because with the payoffs (14) the strategic double spillover effect that
potentially raises R&D efforts under no cooperation does not exist.28 The ranking gives nev-
ertheless a clear framework for illustrating the misalignment between individual and aggregate
payoffs. The Lemma shows that such a misalignment arises between early and late cooperation
if there exists a country i whose overall externality (εi) exceeds twice the size of the externality
26A similar specification is used by Harstad (2012).
27This definition is convenient, because welfare often depends on the parameters βi and ρi only via this
expression. The interpretation of it as an ‘aggregate measure of the externalities’ is plausible because the
expression depends symmetrically on βi and ρi and is strictly increasing in these parameters.
28This is because for the given cost functions ∂2Ci/(∂ai∂r−i) = 0; see the proof of Lemma 1.
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caused by the other country (ε
−i). The Lemma moreover shows that if the abatement exter-
nalities do not differ too much (β1 <
√
2β2 and β2 <
√
2β1), then both countries still prefer
late cooperation to no cooperation. In this case, country i (with εi > 2ε−i) anticipates that the
other country also prefers late to no cooperation. As a result, it will block early cooperation
and only an agreement on late cooperation is sustainable.
Lemma 4 compares the payoffs under different, exogenously-given time structures of abate-
ment and R&D decisions. We can now use these results in order to endogenize the success and
the timing of cooperation in the overall game.29 To this end, it is convenient to define relative
externalities (εr and βr) as follows:
εr ≡ ε1
ε2
and βr ≡ β1
β2
,
We can now state the main result of this subsection:
Proposition 6 If the payoff functions are given by (14), the endogenous success and timing of
cooperation in the overall game depend on the relative externalities (εr, βr) as follows:




2) and εr ∈ (1/2, 2), then in equilibrium early cooperation succeeds;




2) and εr 6∈ (1/2, 2), then late cooperation takes place;
iii) if βr >
√
2 and εr > 2, or βr < 1/
√
2 and εr < 1/2, cooperation fails entirely;
iv) if βr >
√
2 and εr < 2, or βr < 1/
√
2 and εr > 1/2, either early or no cooperation is
obtained in equilibrium, depending on the exact values of βr and εr.30
Figure 2 illustrates these results in a graph.31
Figure 2
29In general, it is not sufficient to compare welfare in these cases in order to derive the equilibrium outcome
of the overall game. The problem is that – if late cooperation is expected to fail for a given set of R&D
strategies r1 and r2 – then a country may change its R&D effort in order to induce the other country to agree
to cooperate. However, for the given functional forms, this type of strategy is ineffective, as shown in the proof
of Proposition 6.
30The original parameter space is 4-dimensional (β1, β2, ρ1, ρ2). It is, thus, remarkable that in cases i–iii,
the equilibrium outcome depends only on the relative externalities εr and βr. Only in case iv, the equilibrium
outcome (early / no cooperation) depends on the full set of parameters. Hence, to determine the combinations





resp. Πe2 = Π
n
2 ), further parameter restrictions must be imposed. To construct the separating curves in Figure
2, we assumed ρ2 = 1, β2 ≡ ρ1, and then eliminated ρ1 to obtain two relations εr = εr(βr), corresponding to
Πe1 = Π
n





31By symmetry, it suffices to plot the results for βr ≥ 1. Results for βr < 1 contain no further information.
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fulfilled for both countries, early cooperation succeeds if the overall externalities εi caused by
each country i are also not too different (hence, if the condition εi ≤ 2ε−i in Lemma 4 is
fulfilled). If the ratio εr becomes more extreme, the redistributive effect becomes relevant, and
the country that causes the stronger overall externality, prefers to delay cooperation. Hence,
late cooperation is obtained in equilibrium. For more extreme values of βr (βr >
√
2), hence,
when the abatement externalities caused by the two countries are very different, the country
that causes the stronger abatement externality prefers no cooperation to late cooperation.
Cooperation then fails entirely, unless there is also a sufficiently strong R&D externality that
works in favor of that country. In this case, the complementarity effect dominates, and both
countries prefer early cooperation over the non-cooperative outcome. This explains why in
Figure 2, the early cooperation outcome can be obtained also for extreme values of βr, provided
that εr is in the relevant range.
To see this latter point more clearly, let us finally apply this specification of our model also
to an example with two unilateral externalities. Suppose, country 1 benefits only from R&D
spillovers (ρ2 > β2 = 0), and country 2 benefits only from an abatement externality caused by
country 1 (β1 > ρ1 = 0). This yields (see the proof of Lemma 4):
Πn
1
= 1 + ρ2 , Π
n
2
= 1 + β1;
Πe
1








































, so that country 1 always rejects late cooperation. Hence, either early
cooperation succeeds, or cooperation fails completely. For early cooperation to succeed, it




, which yields the condition
√





yields ρ2 ≤ 2
√
2β1. Overall, we find that early cooperation succeeds if
√
2β1 ≤ ρ2 ≤ 2
√
2β1.
Hence, as Proposition 5 indicates, given two unilateral externalities that go in opposite di-
rections, early cooperation can succeed (when both externalities are of comparable strength).
Otherwise, the country that causes the stronger externality rejects early cooperation. Using
our earlier parameter transformation, the range where early cooperation succeeds becomes:
1/8 ≤ εr ≤ 1/2,
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while (for β2 = ρ1 → 0) the ratio βr converges to infinity. Hence, in Figure 2, this extreme case
of two unilateral externalities corresponds to the limit where βr → ∞. Indeed, it can be shown
that the separating curves in Figure 2, where country 1 (country 2) is indifferent between early
and no cooperation (right-hand side of the Figure), converge to 1/2 resp. 1/8 as βr → ∞.
5 Application to Global Warming
In this section, we introduce a specification of benefit and cost functions that is suitable espe-
cially for an application of the model to the issue of global warming.
Because the damages of global warming do not depend on where the greenhouse gases
are emitted, we set the abatement externality equal to the marginal benefit parameter of the
country affected by the externality: βi = b−i. Hence, the benefits of abatement for each country
depend only on the aggregate level of abatement: a ≡ a1+a2. Furthermore, we assume that also
R&D is a pure public good, highlighting the problem of knowledge spillovers across countries
(e.g. Jaffe et al. 2005). In particular, we use the following cost function:




where r ≡ r1 + r2. Under this specification, country i’s investment cost in R&D is a quadratic
function of ri. Similarly, the abatement cost is quadratic in ai, and declining in the aggregate
level of R&D.
The asymmetry we consider is one where countries differ in their appreciation of abatement.
In particular, we assume b1 = b+ δ and b2 = b− δ, where b > 0 and δ ≥ 0. This yields for the
countries’ payoff functions:













where δ ∈ [0, b/2] assures an interior solution. If δ > 0, country 1 values abatement more
than country 2. Note, however, that the aggregated benefit B1(a) +B2(a) is always 2ba. This
property allows us to derive closed-form solutions for all cases (see the proof of Lemma 5).
Lemma 5 Suppose countries’ payoff functions are given by (15). Then aggregate payoffs are
ranked as Πe ≥ Πl ≥ Πn. Contrary to this ranking, there exists a critical value δ1(b) > 0




) iff δ > δ1(b). Furthermore,
there exists a critical value δ2(b) > δ1(b) such that in the subgame LN, country 2 vetoes late
cooperation iff δ > δ2(b), because Π
n
2
(r1, r2) > Π
l
2
(r1, r2) then holds for any given R&D levels.
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Note, that the Lemma implies that in the subgame LN, late cooperation may fail even if both
countries prefer the late cooperation to the no cooperation outcome, when the R&D efforts are
determined endogenously in both cases. The problem is that when δ > δ2(b), both countries
realize that for any given R&D levels, late cooperation will fail in the second stage of the
subgame LN because country 2 cannot commit to cooperate when countries determine their





in the first stage, which (for δ close to δ2(b)) leaves them both worse off than under late
cooperation.
We can now characterize the equilibrium outcome of the overall game.
Proposition 7 If the payoff functions are given by (15), early cooperation succeeds in the
overall game iff δ < δ1(b). If δ ∈ [δ1(b), δ2(b)], late cooperation is obtained in equilibrium. If
δ > δ2(b), cooperation fails entirely.
The result of Proposition 7 is best understood by considering Figure 3, which shows country
2’s payoff under early, late, and no cooperation (for b = γ = 1, using (19), (20), and (21)).
Figure 3
The discontinuity reflects the transition from the late to the no cooperation outcome. The
figure illustrates that only when δ is small, early cooperation succeeds, while late cooperation
can be sustained for a considerably larger set of parameter values. Although early cooperation
leads to a higher aggregated welfare than late cooperation, country 2 rejects early cooperation
already under a small degree of asymmetry. Under early cooperation, equal abatement levels
are assigned to both countries (due to the symmetry of the abatement cost functions). Under
late cooperation, in contrast, costs can be redistributed between countries via their strategic
choice of R&D levels (redistributive effect). This makes late cooperation sustainable for higher
degrees of asymmetry.
6 Conclusion
The Tinbergen rule on public policy (e.g., Tinbergen 1952) tells us that in order to implement
multiple policy targets, at least one policy tool is required for each target. Applying this rule
32Also under this specification, the strategy of country i to manipulate its R&D effort ri to induce country
−i to agree to cooperate late when early cooperation has failed, turns out to be ineffective (see the Proof
of Lemma 5). This simplifies the characterization of the equilibrium of the overall game (see Proposition 7),
because it suffices to compare the payoffs under the different, exogenously-given modes of cooperation.
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to cooperation, one cannot expect a climate treaty that addresses only abatement targets to
attain the first-best outcome in the presence of multiple market failures such as environmental
externalities and knowledge spillovers. Going beyond this classical Tinbergen rule, our analysis
shows that things can actually be worse: long-term treaties that address only one externality
may fail to materialize, even when they have the potential to raise global welfare substantially.
We demonstrated this feature in a stylized model of cooperation between two countries and
two externalities that act asymmetrically.
A pessimistic insight from our analysis is that even small asymmetries between countries
can cause an inefficient delay in cooperation. Due to the redistributive effect, especially early
(long-term) cooperation is very vulnerable to asymmetries. The reason for this is that a delay
in cooperation can put one of the countries in a strategically favorable position. A country that
benefits relatively less from climate protection can, via its strategic choice of R&D, shift the
burden of abatement costs towards the other country. This favors late (short-term) cooperation,
and makes it sustainable also for higher degrees of asymmetry.
On a more optimistic note, we identified a positive complementarity effect of early cooper-
ation. If this effect is dominant, even strong asymmetries do not necessarily destabilize early
cooperation. With primarily unilateral externalities, for instance, where one country has (rel-
atively) higher benefits of abatement, while the other country benefits mostly from knowledge
spillovers, long-term climate treaties are sustainable. Intuitively, early cooperation requires
both countries to adopt more ambitious abatement targets. Therefore, a country with higher
benefits of abatement, such as for instance an industrialized country with a relatively high
willingness-to-pay for climate stability, may agree to cooperate early in order to induce the
other country to abate more as well. Conversely, a country that benefits mostly from knowl-
edge spillovers, such as for instance a developing country with a high potential for abatement,
may agree to a long-term abatement target in order to induce the other country to subsequently
invest more in R&D. Such an interdependency in countries’ welfare in the presence of multiple
market failures facilitates the formation of an early agreement on long-term emission targets.
Our results indicate that the current stalemate in climate negotiations may not necessarily
imply that cooperation will fail also in the future. It may simply be a result of strategic delay,
with adverse effects upon global welfare. If such a delay is caused by asymmetries between
countries, then our results suggest that additional knowledge spillovers might help to reach
an earlier and more effective agreement on abatement targets. E.g., countries could try to
foster technology transfers, in order to compensate countries that benefit relatively less from
26
abatement spillovers for their additional emission reduction efforts.33
33A ‘Technology Mechanism’ was agreed by the 16’th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Cancun, 2010.
“The Technology Mechanism is expected to facilitate the implementation of enhanced action on technol-




This appendix collects the formal proofs of the lemmas and propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1: Due to the convexity of Ci, it is to show that the right-hand side of
(5) is non-negative. In the presence of an abatement externality, we have β
−i > 0 so that it
remains to be shown that ∂an
−i/∂ri ≥ 0. To determine the sign of ∂an−i/∂ri, we use the first-
order conditions (4) of stage 2 and insert the functions an
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(r1, r2) and a
n
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Because by assumption ∂2C
−i/∂a−i∂ri ≤ 0, the numerator is non-positive, and due to ∂2Ci/∂a2i >
0 the denominator is positive. Hence, ∂an
−i/∂ri ≥ 0, which proves that the right-hand side of
(5) is non-negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: To show that the overall strategic effect in stage 1 of the early
cooperation game increases total welfare, note that countries could neglect this effect in the
cooperative stage 1. Hence, the effect raises welfare whenever it affects the final outcome, and
(by (7)) it affects the final outcome in the presence of R&D spillovers.
To show the second claim, note that the functions re
1
(a1, a2) and r
e
2
(a1, a2) that describe the































































Given the assumptions ∂2Ci/∂r
2
i > 0, ∂
2Ci/∂ri∂r−i ≥ 0, and ∂2Ci/∂r2i > ∂2Ci/∂ri∂r−i, the de-
nominator is always positive. Using ∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri < 0 and ∂
2Ci/∂ri∂r−i ≥ 0, we find that
∂rei /∂ai > 0 and ∂r
e






∣. If countries are symmetric, then ∂C
−i/∂ri = ∂Ci/∂r−i. The overall
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strategic effect is, then, always negative, which (by (8) and (7)) implies higher abatement and
higher R&D levels than in the absence of the strategic effect. Q.E.D.
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Using the regularity conditions ∂2Ci/∂a
2
i > 0, ∂
2Ci/∂ai∂ri < 0, ∂
2Ci/∂ai∂r−i ≤ 0, and
|∂2Ci/∂ai∂ri| ≥ |∂2Ci/∂ai∂r−i|, we find that ∂ali/∂ri is positive and ∂ali/∂r−i non-negative, and






0, which (by (11)) implies lower R&D efforts than in the absence of the strategic effect. The
reduction in R&D-levels aggravates the problem of under-investments in R&D (relative to the
full cooperation case) and, therefore, reduces total welfare. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Without R&D externalities we have ∂C
−i/∂ri = 0. Using (2)








) is with i = 1, 2 characterized by
∂Ci
∂ai


















= bi + βi.
The result follows immediately because the two systems of optimality conditions coincide.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Without abatement externalities we have β1 = β2 = 0. Using
























by the same system of optimality conditions. Hence, the outcome without cooperation and
with late cooperation are identical.
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Early cooperation satisfies the system (8) and (7), which differs from the other system of
equations due to the presence of strategic effects. By ignoring them, in stage 1 countries can
assure a total welfare at least as large as under late or no cooperation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The outcome under late cooperation is characterized by the
system (10) and (11). According the Lemma 3, the overall strategic effect in stage 1 (see (11))
is welfare-reducing if β1 = β2. The outcome under early cooperation satisfies the system (8)
and (7), which differs from (10) and (11). According to Lemma 2, the overall strategic effect
in stage 1 (see (7)) is welfare-enhancing. The claim, thus, follows immediately from Lemma 2
and Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: To show that cooperation in the countries’ choices of abatement
targets fails when there is a unilateral abatement externality but no R&D externality, note that
the country that generates the abatement externality can achieve its own welfare maximum
without any cooperation. Hence, this country can never gain from cooperating.
To show that cooperation fails when there is a unilateral R&D externality but no abatement
externality, note first that by Proposition 2 late cooperation in abatement yields no welfare
gains. Furthermore, early cooperation fails, because the country that generates the R&D
externality has no gains from it. It is assigned a higher abatement level in the cooperative
stage (stage 1) in order to trigger additional R&D investments by this country in stage 2. This
reduces the welfare of this country that can achieve its own welfare maximum without any
cooperation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: To show the first claim, note that the country that generates
both externalities achieves its individual welfare maximum without any cooperation. Hence,
whenever cooperation affects the final outcome, it negatively affects this country’s welfare.
To show that late cooperation fails if each of the unilateral externalities affects a different
country, note that for fixed R&D levels, the country that generates the abatement externality
suffers from cooperation in stage 2. For any given R&D levels, it attains its individual welfare
maximum when ignoring the abatement externality. Hence, it rejects late cooperation.
To show that early cooperation can succeed if both externalities are of comparable strength
and each affects a different country, it suffices to demonstrate that there exists an example
where this holds. Such an example is provided at the end of Section 4.2. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 4: Straightforward calculations yield the following results:
1. No cooperation:
ani = 1 and r
n
i = 1;
Πni = 1 + β−i + ρ−i; (16)
Πn = 2 + β1 + β2 + ρ1 + ρ2.
2. Early cooperation:
aei =
3 + 2βi + ρi
3
and rei =
3 + βi + ρi/2
3
< rfi ;



















ali = 1 + βi/2 and r
l
i = 1 = r
n
i ;
Πli = 1 + β−i + ρ−i + β
2
−i/2− β2i /4; (18)






A direct comparison yields Πe ≥ Πl ≥ Πn.
Moreover, ∆Πeli ≡ Πei − Πli = (2ε−i − εi)/12 so that Πei < Πli if εi > 2ε−i. Furthermore,
comparing (16) and (18), we find that ∆Πlni ≡ Πli−Πni = (2β2−i−β2i )/4 so that country i prefers










i − 1)/4 + εi(2ε−i/εi − 1)/12. Q.E.D.
Before we state the proof of Proposition 6, we establish the following useful Lemma:
Lemma 6 If ∆Πlni (r1, r2) ≡ Πli(r1, r2) − Πni (r1, r2) is independent of r−i for i = 1, 2, then in





) ≥ Πni (rn1 , rn2 ) for i = 1, 2.
Proof of Lemma 6: If ∆Πlni (r1, r2) does not depend on r−i for i = 1, 2, then country i’s
decision whether to accept or reject the formation of a late coalition (li) is independent of r−i.
Hence, if (for any given r
−i) country i prefers the cooperative outcome given ri = r
l
i over the
non-cooperative outcome obtained under rni , and the same holds true for the other country,
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) are optimal given this expectation.
Conversely, if there is at least one country i that (for any given r
−i) prefers the outcome under
no cooperation given rni to the outcome obtained under late cooperation given r
l
i, then this
country chooses ri = r
n
i , planning to reject late cooperation, irrespective of the value of r−i
chosen by the other country (which is fixed when countries choose li). Hence, country −i
cannot affect country i’s cooperation decision in the LN-subgame via its own R&D choice, and




) accordingly. A necessary





) ≥ Πni (rn1 , rn2 )
holds for i = 1 and i = 2. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, if ri affects country −i’s payoff under late cooperation, Πl−i(r1, r2), in exactly the
same way as it affects Πn
−i(r1, r2), then a change in ri has no effect upon country −i’s decision
whether to enter a late coalition or not. In that case, it suffices to compare the payoffs under
the no cooperation case (Section 3.2) with the payoffs in the late cooperation case (Section 3.4)
to derive the equilibrium in the subgame LN.
Proof of Proposition 6: By (14), r
−i enters linearly in country i’s payoff. Therefore,
both under late and under no cooperation, country i’s abatement following the R&D stage,
ai(r1, r2), is independent of r−i. It follows immediately that ∆Π
ln
i (r1, r2) is also independent
of r
−i, so Lemma 6 applies. Hence, to determine the endogenous success and the timing of
cooperation in the overall game, it suffices to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the early,
late, and no cooperation cases. Now we apply Lemma 4.




2) and εr ∈ (1/2, 2) then it follows from the Lemma that for either country
i ∈ {1, 2} we have the ordering Πei ≥ Πli ≥ Πni . This leads to the unique equilibrium outcome
of early cooperation.




2) and εr 6∈ (1/2, 2) then for either country i ∈ {1, 2} it holds Πli > Πni ,
while there exists one country j for which Πej < Π
l
j. This leads to the late cooperation outcome.
If βr >
√








, and country 1’s most preferred outcome
is Πn
1
. Because country 1 can obtain this outcome by rejecting both early and late cooperation,
there is no cooperation in any subgame perfect equilibrium. By symmetry the same holds for
























, also county 1’s





county 1’s preferred outcome is no cooperation, which it can always reach by rejecting any form
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of cooperation. As a result, the unique equilibrium outcome is no cooperation. In the Proof
of Lemma 4, it is shown that Πei − Πni = β2i (2β2−i/β2i − 1)/4 + εi(2ε−i/εi − 1)/12 so that the





2), and the latter one for βr sufficiently large. By symmetry, the same holds
for βr < 1/
√
2 and εr ∈ (1/2, 2). Finally, if εr < 1/2 and βr >
√

















. Again, late cooperation is never obtained as
country 1 prefers the non-cooperative over the late cooperation outcome. Hence, either early
or no cooperation is obtained in equilibrium. Q.E.D.














































































34In the second stage of the early cooperation subgame, countries minimize their individual costs, given (a1, a2)
determined in the first stage. As a result, reduced cost functions Ci(a1, a2) are obtained that depend only on
the abatement levels. The target function in stage 1 is then: 2ba−C1(a1, a2)−C2(a1, a2). This is independent




) are, therefore, identical. This symmetry property simplifies the derivation of the
early cooperation outcome.

















A direct comparison yields Πe ≥ Πl ≥ Πn.
Given these results, it is straight-forward to verify that in the relevant range, country 2




) iff δ ≤ δ1(b) ≡ (307− 2
√
21781)b/250 ≈ 0.047b.
In the subgame LN, for given R&D levels (r1, r2), late cooperation succeeds if both countries
achieve a higher welfare than in the absence of cooperation, hence, if ∆Πln
1
(r1, r2) ≥ 0 and
∆Πln
2
(r1, r2) ≥ 0. Under no cooperation (for fixed R&D levels (r1, r2)), country i’s abatement








(r1, r2) = (b+ δ)r/2 and a
n
2
(r1, r2) = (b− δ)r/2,
and, hence: a = br. Countries’ payoffs, thus, become:
Πn
1
(r1, r2) = (3b




(r1, r2) = (3b
2 − 2bδ − δ2)r/4− γr2
2
.
Under late cooperation (again for fixed R&D levels), country i’s abatement is determined by





= br, and a = 2br.
This yields the following expressions for welfare:
Πl
1
(r1, r2) = (b




(r1, r2) = (b






(r1, r2) = (b
2 + 6bδ + δ2)r/4 > 0 and ∆Πln
2
(r1, r2) = (b
2 − 6bδ + δ2)r/4.
Hence, for any fixed (r1, r2), country 1 is always willing to cooperate. Country 2 cooperates
if b2 − 6bδ + δ2 ≥ 0, which, for the relevant interval δ ∈ [0, b/2], yields the critical value
δ2(b) ≡ b(3− 2
√
2) ≈ 0.17b. If δ is below this value, it holds that ∆Πln
2
(r1, r2) > 0. As δ2(b) is
independent of r1 and r2, late cooperation succeeds in the subgame LN iff δ ≤ δ2(b). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: It is straight-forward to show (using (20) and (21)) that coun-
try 1 always prefers the early over the late cooperation outcome. The result, thus, follows
immediately from Lemma 5. Q.E.D.
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